Hispanic Population Growth Engenders Conservative Shift Among Non-Hispanic Racial Minorities

Maureen A. Craig¹ and Jennifer A. Richeson²,³

Abstract

The racial/ethnic diversity of the United States is increasing, yet recent social psychological research has focused primarily on White Americans’ reactions to this demographic trend. The present research experimentally examines how members of different racial minority groups perceive increasing diversity, driven by Hispanic population growth, focusing on downstream consequences for political ideology and policy preferences. Four studies reveal that making Hispanic population growth salient leads non-Hispanic racial minorities to identify as more conservative and support more conservative policy positions, compared with control information. The policy preferences of Hispanics, however, were not affected by exposure to information about their in-group’s growth. Considered in tandem with previous research, the present studies suggest that Hispanic population growth may motivate greater support for conservative ideology among members of both racial majority and minority groups.

Keywords

conservative shift, demographic changes, population growth, intergroup relations

The U.S. racial demographic landscape is shifting toward a “majority–minority” nation—that is, non-Hispanic Whites are projected to make up less than 50% of the U.S. population by midcentury (e.g., Frey, 2013). Despite the “majority–minority” terminology implying a monolithic “racial minority” collective, some groups are predicted to contribute to the demographic shift more than are others. Specifically, while both the Hispanic and Asian American populations are expected to more than double between 2012 and 2060 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012), many media accounts have emphasized Hispanics’ contributions to the national racial shift (e.g., CNN, 2008; Roberts, 2008). The present work investigates how non-Hispanic racial minority group members perceive Hispanic population growth, considering the downstream consequences for political ideology and policy preferences.

Minority Group Growth and Political/Social Attitudes

Considerable social scientific research has examined dominant groups’ reactions to minority group size (see Blalock, 1967; Quillian, 1995), revealing that Whites who perceive Blacks and Hispanics to be relatively higher proportions of the population also perceive greater threat from racial minorities and express more exclusionary attitudes (e.g., Alba, Rumbaut, & Marotz, 2005; Nadeau, Niemi, & Levine, 1993). System justification theory and related research (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004) suggest that such threats can elicit greater endorsement of political conservatism, largely due to the role of conservative policies in preserving the status quo (i.e., existing traditions and hierarchies; Jost, 2009).

Even projected increases in racial minority group size can instigate threat and a shift toward conservatism among Whites. Specifically, exposure to increasing national diversity can lead Whites to perceive threat to their status in society (as the dominant or prototypical group), eliciting greater endorsement of conservative political ideology (Craig & Richeson, 2014a; Willer, Feinberg, & Wets, 2016), the expression of more negative racial attitudes and emotions (Craig & Richeson, 2014b; Outten, Schmitt, Miller, & Garcia, 2012), and opposition to diversity (Danbold & Huo, 2015). Taken together, this literature reveals that minority population growth can activate majority group members’ concerns about their in-group’s status that, subsequently, motivates conservatism.

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Although this area of inquiry is emergent, the lack of consideration of racial minority group members’ reactions to changing demographics is palpable. Indeed, little experimental research has examined minority group members’ reactions to projected population changes (for a notable exception, see Abascal, 2015), and none (to our knowledge) has explored the potential political consequences. Correlational studies reveal an association between minority group members’ neighborhood racial demographics and perceived threat (e.g., Barreto & Sanchez, 2014; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; McClain et al., 2006). For example, among Blacks and Hispanics, the more minority out-group (i.e., Hispanic or Black, respectively) neighbors survey respondents had, the greater their perceived competition with that group (Barreto & Sanchez, 2014; Gay, 2006; McClain et al., 2006; cf. Oliver & Wong, 2003). There is some evidence, then, that like Whites, racial minority group members may perceive the population growth of another minority group as a threat to the in-group’s societal standing. Given that marginalized group members have been found to defend the very systems in which they are marginalized and are not immune to the psychological processes that often promote such system justification via conservative ideology (e.g., motives to reduce threat and uncertainty; see Jost & Hunyady, 2005), the present research examines whether perceived threat from the growth of one racial minority group may elicit greater endorsement of conservative ideology and policies among members of other racial minority groups.

Four studies test the effect of salient racial minority out-group growth on identification with and support for conservative ideology. We focus on the effect of Hispanic population growth, given the salient and pervasive media narrative highlighting Hispanics’ role in increasing national diversity. Further, if population growth signals gains in societal status (see Blalock, 1967), the growth of a relatively lower status group may be particularly likely to signal a disruption to the status quo and elicit a shift toward conservative ideology. Thus, we predict that Hispanic population growth will lead members of other racial minority groups to identify as relatively more conservative (Study 1a) and express greater support for conservative policies (Studies 1b–4). Although not the primary focus of the present research, we also explore whether Asian American population growth influences conservative policy support (Study 4).

**Method**

**Participants**

Study 1a included 83 non-Hispanic racial minority participants recruited from MTurk.com for $0.50.\(^1\) For this initial test, we aimed for a sample size of a minimum of 40 participants per between-subjects cell. Study 1b included 180 non-Hispanic racial minority undergraduate students who participated for partial course credit. Sample size was determined by the number of students who had participated by the end of two academic terms.

**Procedure, Materials, and Measures**

Participants provided informed consent and completed an initial set of demographic questions, including two baseline political ideology items.\(^2\) Participants indicated their agreement (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) with liberal and conservative ideology (“I endorse many aspects of liberal [conservative] political ideology”). These items were strongly correlated with one another (S1a: \( r = -0.69, p < .001 \); S1b: \( r = -0.57, p < .001 \)), so the liberal endorsement item was reverse-coded and the items averaged to create a baseline conservative endorsement index. On average, participants were relatively liberal (S1a: \( M = 3.33, 95\%\ CI [3.00, 3.65] \), \( SD = 1.53; \) S1b: \( M = 3.35, 95\%\ CI [3.16, 3.55], SD = 1.24 \)).

Participants were then randomly assigned to read a brief newspaper article either about the growth of the U.S. Hispanic population (Hispanic growth condition) or increasing geographic mobility (control condition) in the United States (see supplemental materials). The Hispanic growth condition presented veridical information that Hispanics were currently (as of 2014) the nation’s largest ethnic/racial minority group and that the Hispanic population was projected to more than double between 2012 and 2060 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012, 2013; USA Today, 2011). The article was accompanied by a graph depicting the projected populations for Hispanics, Blacks, and Asians. Participants in the control condition also read information about a changing national demographic trend—an increase in people moving throughout the United States (see Craig & Richeson, 2014a). We assessed whether participants paid attention to the article by asking basic questions about it immediately after reading it (e.g., participants in the Hispanic growth condition were asked which group was the primary contributor to U.S. population growth).

In Study 1a, one item assessed participants’ postmanipulation political ideology: “In general, do you think of yourself as . . .” (1 = extremely liberal, 7 = extremely conservative).

In Study 1b, participants indicated their views on 11 policies (e.g., establishing English as the official U.S. language, drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve, restricting handgun ownership; see supplemental materials for the full list of policy items for all studies). In all studies assessing policy attitudes, items were coded such that higher scores indicate greater endorsement of the conservative position (Republican National Committee, 2012, 2016). Whether policy items were related or
unrelated to immigration generally did not moderate effects (see supplemental materials for these analyses for all studies), and thus, for all studies, we report the results for the combined, overall policy index. Scale endpoints differed across items, so responses were standardized before combining into the overall conservative policy endorsement index ($\alpha = .70$). Finally, participants completed other demographic questions (e.g., age) and were debriefed.

Results and Discussion

Study 1a

Consistent with predictions, participants for whom Hispanic population growth was salient identified as relatively more conservative ($M_{adj} = 3.69$, 95% CI [3.39, 3.99], $SE = 0.15$) than did participants in the control condition ($M_{adj} = 3.11$, 95% CI [2.85, 3.38], $SE = 0.13$), controlling for baseline political ideology, $F(1, 80) = 8.15, p = .005$, $\eta_p^2 = .09$. Notably, participants’ average postmanipulation political ideology in both conditions fell below the midpoint of the scale ($4 = \text{Moderate}$), and hence, on average, participants maintained relatively liberal identification.

Study 1b

One participant who indicated that his or her in-group (rather than Hispanics) drove the population shift and 20 participants who incorrectly responded to an attention check item explicitly asking participants to indicate a particular response (somewhat agree) were removed from the sample. The final sample included 159 participants (81 Hispanic growth conditions, 78 control conditions).

Consistent with predictions, participants who read about the Hispanic population growth ($M_{adj} = 0.07$, 95% CI [−0.03, 0.16], $SE = 0.05$) supported conservative positions more than did participants who read about geographic mobility ($M_{adj} = −0.07$, 95% CI [−0.16, 0.03], $SE = 0.05$), controlling for baseline political ideology, $F(1, 156) = 3.94, p = .049$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$.

Taken together, Studies 1a and 1b suggest that, like White Americans, racial minority group members respond to minority out-group growth with relatively more conservative identification and express more conservative (less liberal) positions on a number of different policies.

Study 2

Study 1 provides initial evidence that making Hispanic population growth salient may motivate political conservatism among members of other racial minority groups. However, the experimental manipulation in Study 1 identified both immigration and higher fertility rates as contributing factors of Hispanic population growth, leaving some ambiguity as to whether the effect on political ideology/attitudes was solely driven by concerns regarding foreign immigration, rather than the rising size of the Hispanic population more generally. To disambiguate this, in Study 2, non-Hispanic racial minorities read about Hispanic population growth driven by (a) immigration or (b) birthrates of U.S. citizens, or they read control information and then reported their policy positions. We predicted that participants in both Hispanic growth conditions would express more support for conservative policies compared with control participants but did not have strong predictions regarding whether policy support would differ among participants in the two Hispanic growth conditions.

Method

Participants

One hundred and seventy-two non-Hispanic racial minority participants were recruited from MTurk.com for $0.75. We aimed for a minimum of 50 participants per cell based on an a priori power analysis to achieve power of .80 utilizing the effect size of the previous MTurk study (S1a).

Procedure, Materials, and Measures

Participants provided informed consent and completed some demographic questions, including the two baseline political ideology items ($r = −.62, p < .001$) from Study 1. On average, participants identified as relatively liberal ($M = 3.36$, 95% CI [3.14, 3.59], $SD = 1.53$).

Participants were then randomly assigned to read a brief newspaper article either about the growth of the Hispanic population or increasing geographic mobility (control condition) in the United States. There were two versions of the Hispanic growth information (see supplemental materials); the title and one paragraph of the article differed such that participants either read that the Hispanic population was growing due to an influx in foreign-born Hispanics (immigration-driven growth condition) or a surge in the birthrate of U.S.-born Hispanics (native-born growth condition). Participants were asked basic questions about the article immediately after reading it (e.g., “What is the primary reason for the rapid population growth?” 1 = increased immigration from foreign countries, 2 = higher birthrates among U.S. citizens, 3 = better access to health care for participants in the Hispanic growth conditions).

Participants then indicated their views on seven policies (e.g., a border wall, same-sex marriage; $\alpha = .77$). Again, responses were standardized prior to creating the policy index reflecting support for conservative positions. Last, participants completed additional demographic questions and were debriefed.

Results and Discussion

Participants in the immigration-driven growth condition were more likely to indicate that immigration (vs. U.S. citizens’ birthrates) is driving Hispanic population growth than participants in the native-born growth condition, $\chi^2(1, N = 121) = 94.84, p < .001$, suggesting that the manipulation was successful. Furthermore, consistent with Study 1, an effect of
experimental condition on policy attitudes emerged, controlling for baseline political ideology, $F(2, 168) = 3.55, p = .031, \eta^2_p = .04$. As depicted in Figure 1, participants in the native-born growth condition ($M_{adj} = 0.10, 95\% \text{ CI } [-0.03, 0.22], SE = 0.06$) expressed more conservative positions than participants in the control condition ($M_{adj} = -0.16, 95\% \text{ CI } [-0.30, -0.01], SE = 0.07$), $F(1, 168) = 6.95, p = .009, \eta^2_p = .04$. Participants in the immigration-driven growth condition ($M_{adj} = 0.02, 95\% \text{ CI } [-0.11, 0.15], SE = 0.07$) expressed marginally more conservative positions, compared with control condition participants, $F(1, 168) = 3.25, p = .073, \eta^2_p = .02$. The political preferences expressed by participants in the native-born growth and immigration-driven growth conditions did not reliably differ, $F(1, 168) < 1, p = .399$.

In sum, the results echo those of Study 1, revealing that salient Hispanic population growth leads non-Hispanic racial minority group members to express more conservative policy positions. Further, while the size of the conservative shift effect was somewhat larger for individuals who were informed that the growth was due to native-born birthrates than those for whom immigration was the purported driving force (compared with the control condition), the policy attitudes expressed by individuals in the two Hispanic growth conditions did not differ. Consequently, the present findings suggest that the results of Study 1 are not solely attributable to participants’ reactions to and concerns about increasing immigration, but, rather, to Hispanic population growth more generally.

Study 3

While Studies 1 and 2 reveal that Hispanic population growth can elicit a shift toward conservatism among other racial minority groups, the putative role of perceived threat in engendering conservative shift requires that we rule out the possibility that learning about the growth of any group (including one’s in-group) elicits greater conservatism. That is, population growth should signal a threat to the current hierarchy only for groups not portrayed as rising in numbers (and, presumably, perceived status). Thus, Studies 3a and 3b examine how Hispanic population growth information is perceived by both non-Hispanic racial minority group members and Hispanics themselves.

Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, we predicted that among non-Hispanic racial minority group members, Hispanic population growth information would elicit more support for conservative policy positions than control information. Importantly, we did not expect Hispanic participants to express more conservative policy positions if Hispanic population growth was salient.

Method

Participants

In Study 3a, 190 participants (142 non-Hispanic racial minorities, 48 Hispanic) were recruited from MTurk.com for $0.30. Data were collected as part of a larger project primarily focusing on Whites’ reactions to increasing diversity (see Craig & Richeson, 2014a); thus, sample size was determined by the number of minority participants who participated by the time the sample size requirements for White participants were met. In Study 3b, 535 participants (176 Asian American, 187 Black, and 172 Hispanic) were recruited from the Qualtrics Online Sample. We aimed for a minimum of 150 participants from each ethnic group.

Procedure, Materials, and Measures

Participants provided informed consent and completed demographic questions, including the two baseline political ideology items (S3a: $r = -.66, p < .001$; S3b: $r = -.36, p < .001$). Again, the samples were relatively liberal (S3a: $M = 3.06, 95\% \text{ CI } [2.84, 3.27], SD = 1.51$; S3b: $M = 3.62, 95\% \text{ CI } [3.50, 3.74], SD = 1.30$).

Participants then read an article providing the experimental manipulation. In Study 3a, Hispanic population growth information was presented more subtly than in the prior studies. Specifically, participants were randomly assigned to read about projected increases in U.S. racial diversity, largely driven by growth in the Hispanic population (U.S. racial shift condition; see Craig & Richeson, 2014b S2), or projected increases in the ethnic minority immigrant populations in the Netherlands (control condition). The U.S. racial shift condition utilized the “majority–minority” nation terminology, while still explicitly describing Hispanics as primary contributors to the racial demographic shift. Study 3b utilized the Hispanic growth experimental manipulation from Study 1.

After the experimental manipulation, participants indicated their policy views (S3a: 6 items, $\alpha = .75$; S3b: 6 items, $\alpha = .77$). Again, responses were standardized and indices reflected support for conservative positions. Finally, participants completed additional demographic questions and were debriefed.

Results

Study 3a

A 2(participant ethnicity: Hispanic, non-Hispanic racial minorities) $\times$ 2(experimental condition: U.S. racial shift, control)
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) on policy attitudes, controlling for baseline political ideology, revealed a main effect of participant ethnicity, \( F(1, 184) = 13.12, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .07 \), which was qualified by the predicted Participant Ethnicity \( \times \) Experimental Condition interaction, \( F(1, 184) = 8.01, p = .005, \eta^2_p = .04 \). As shown in Figure 2 and Table 1, and replicating Studies 1b and 2, non-Hispanic participants informed of the U.S. demographic shift (driven by Hispanic population growth) supported conservative positions more than did those informed of the Dutch demographic shift, \( F(1, 184) = 6.75, p = .010, \eta^2_p = .04 \). Conversely, Hispanic participants informed of the U.S. demographic shift (driven by their in-group) expressed marginally more liberal policy positions than did control participants, \( F(1, 184) = 3.11, p = .080, \eta^2_p = .02 \).

Study 3b

Eighty-one participants (15%; 36 in the Hispanic growth condition, 45 in the control condition) were excluded from the analyses for incorrectly answering the basic postarticle questions (e.g., “Which group is the primary contributor to the population growth in the United States?”). The final sample included 454 participants (150 Asian, 152 Black, and 152 Hispanic).

A 2(participant ethnicity: Hispanic, non-Hispanic racial minorities) \( \times \) 2(experimental condition: Hispanic growth, control) ANCOVA on policy attitudes, controlling for baseline political ideology, revealed a main effect of participant ethnicity, \( F(1, 449) = 19.39, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .04 \). The predicted Participant Ethnicity \( \times \) Experimental Condition interaction did not reach conventional levels of significance, \( F(1, 449) = 1.69, p = .195 \); given the consistent results of Studies 1–3a, however, we conducted follow-up analyses. As shown in Table 1 and Figure 3, replicating the previous studies, non-Hispanic participants informed of Hispanic population growth supported conservative positions more than did those in the control condition, \( F(1, 449) = 3.99, p = .046, \eta^2_p = .01 \). The policy positions of Hispanic participants were not significantly influenced by Hispanic growth information, \( F(1, 449) < 1, p = .855 \).

Discussion

Studies 3a and 3b suggest that information about the growing Hispanic population may influence non-Hispanic racial minority group members’ policy preferences, but not those of Hispanics—that is, members of the growing group. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that information about increasing racial diversity, driven by Hispanic population growth, may be threatening for members of racial minority groups that are not growing as much or as rapidly, motivating increased conservative political support.

Study 4

Study 4 examined the remaining question of whether the observed effects of salient Hispanic population growth may generalize to the growth of another racial minority outgroup—Asian Americans. It is possible that any out-group’s growth elicits concerns about one’s group/feelings of threat (e.g., Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958), in which case, Asian population growth should motivate conservatism among non-Asian participants. Alternatively, the perceived status of the growing group or the absolute size of the group, rather than the rate of growth, may shape perceived threat to in-group status. Thus, growth in the Asian American population—a relatively higher status minority group that is still projected to remain a small percentage of the total population—may not be perceived as threatening to the status hierarchy, and thus less likely to motivate conservatism, as Hispanic population growth. To test this question, Asian, Black, and Hispanic participants in Study 4 were randomly assigned to read about Hispanic population growth, Asian population growth, or control information.

We predicted that among Asian and Black participants (but not among Hispanics), Hispanic population growth information would increase conservative policy support, compared with control information. Further, we tested whether Asian population growth elicited greater support for conservative policies among Black and Hispanic, but not Asian, participants.

Method

Participants

In Study 4, 1,343 participants (245 Asian American, 595 Black, and 503 Hispanic) were recruited from the GfK Knowledge Panel. Again, we aimed for a minimum of 75 participants per between-subjects cell.

Procedure, Materials, and Measures

Participants provided informed consent and completed an initial set of demographic questions, if they were not asked these items (e.g., citizenship, political ideology) in prior GfK studies. Baseline political ideology was assessed with a single self-report item (1 = extremely liberal, 7 = extremely conservative). Most participants (Asian sample: 96%; Black sample: 97%; Hispanic sample: 98%) had completed this item in
previous GfK studies. These samples were slightly liberal or moderate (Asian sample: $M = 3.83$, 95% CI [3.66, 4.01], $SD = 1.41$; Black sample: $M = 3.70$, 95% CI [3.59, 3.82], $SD = 1.37$; Hispanic sample: $M = 4.10$, 95% CI [3.97, 4.23], $SD = 1.47$).

Again, an article provided the manipulation of minority population growth (see supplemental materials). Participants were randomly assigned to read about (a) Asian American population growth (Asian growth condition), (b) Hispanic population growth (Hispanic growth condition), or (c) the rising geographic mobility (control condition). Importantly, the statistics and information presented about the population growth were identical across the Asian growth condition and Hispanic growth condition. This information was carefully phrased to be accurate in describing the growth of both ethnic groups. Thus, the only difference across these two conditions was the group described as growing.

After the experimental manipulation, participants indicated their views on five issues (Asian sample: $\alpha = .75$; Black sample: $\alpha = .66$; Hispanic sample: $\alpha = .74$). Responses were standardized prior to creating the conservative policy support indices. Participants then completed additional demographic questions and were debriefed.

## Results

### Analysis and Weighting Strategy

On the recommendations of the GfK statistics team, the Asian, Black, and Hispanic samples were weighted to represent the adult U.S. population balanced across the three conditions within each race. This strategy allows for a test of the effect of the experimental manipulation within each ethnic group, but not for weighted analyses of all respondents combined. Thus, analyses of how the experimental conditions influenced political attitudes were examined separately for each sample. For each sample, we regressed the policy index on experimental condition (with two dummy-coded variables indicating if Hispanic growth was salient and if Asian growth was salient) and participants’ baseline political ideology. These analyses were conducted with Stata (Version 14.2).

### Asian Sample

Consistent with Studies 1–3, among Asian American participants, Hispanic growth information elicited more conservative policy endorsement, compared with control information, $b = 0.36$, $p = .007$, $r_{\text{partial}} = .23$, controlling for baseline political ideology. Conversely, Asian growth information did not influence policy positions, compared with control information, $b = 0.13$, $p = .405$, $r_{\text{partial}} = .08$.

### Black Sample

Unexpectedly, among Black participants, neither the Hispanic growth information ($b = -0.06$, $p = .375$, $r_{\text{partial}} = -.04$) nor the Asian growth information ($b = 0.06$, $p = .374$, $r_{\text{partial}} = .04$) influenced policy positions, compared with control information, controlling for baseline political ideology.

### Hispanic Sample

Among Hispanic participants, neither the Hispanic growth information ($b = -0.08$, $p = .340$, $r_{\text{partial}} = -.05$) nor the Asian growth information ($b = -0.05$, $p = .554$, $r_{\text{partial}} = -.03$) influenced policy positions, compared with control information, controlling for baseline political ideology.

### Discussion

Replicating Studies 1–3, information about Hispanic population growth led Asian Americans in the present study to express more conservative policy support. Information about growth in the Asian American population, however, did not affect Asian

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**Table 1.** Studies 3a and 3b: Descriptive Statistics for Policy Attitudes by Experimental Condition and Participant Ethnicity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control Condition</th>
<th>U.S. Racial Shift/Hispanic Growth Condition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$M$ (95% CI)</td>
<td>$SE$</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Study 3a</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic participants’</td>
<td>-0.08 [-0.25, 0.09]</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>policy attitudes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Hispanic racial</td>
<td>-0.02 [-0.12, 0.07]</td>
<td>0.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>minority participants’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>policy attitudes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Study 3b</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hispanic participants’</td>
<td>-0.16 [-0.30, -0.02]</td>
<td>0.07</td>
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<tr>
<td>policy attitudes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Hispanic racial</td>
<td>0.02 [-0.07, 0.11]</td>
<td>0.05</td>
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<td>minority participants’</td>
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<td>policy attitudes</td>
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**Note.** All items were standardized prior to creating the policy attitude indices. Means are adjusted for baseline political ideology.

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**Figure 3.** Study 3b: Conservative policy endorsement by experimental condition and participant ethnicity, controlling for baseline political ideology. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Americans’, Blacks’, or Hispanics’ policy positions, compared with control information. This pattern of results hints that pre-existing differences in perceived societal status and/or the absolute size of a minority out-group may influence whether minority out-group growth elicits concerns about the current hierarchy and motivates conservatism. Because the effect of Hispanic population growth information on Black Americans’ policy positions did not replicate in this sample, however, the extent to which these factors play a role in the observed effects remains unclear. Further, due to the heterogeneity in findings across samples and studies, we conducted a meta-analysis to estimate the size of the effect of salient Hispanic growth information on different non-Hispanic racial minorities’ conservative policy support.

**Internal Meta-Analysis**

Taken together, Studies 1–4 suggest that information about Hispanic growth can elicit a shift in political attitudes (less liberal, more conservative) among members of non-Hispanic minority groups. As is common with research involving minority populations, however, post hoc power analyses revealed low power in several studies (S3b = .57, S1b = .60, S2 = .66) and adequate to high power in others (S3a = .80, S1a = .81, S4 = .96). Thus, following recent recommendations (e.g., Braver, Thoemmes, & Rosenthal, 2014; Maner, 2014), we meta-analytically calculated the overall effect size estimate.

For Studies 1–3b, to calculate the effect sizes of the experimental manipulation for each participant ethnic group (Asian, Black, all other non-Hispanic participants), we conducted planned contrasts following Experimental Condition × Participant Ethnicity analyses (controlling for baseline political ideology) and calculated correlation coefficients from the $F$-values (Rosnow & Rosenthal, 2003). For Study 4, we calculated correlation coefficients for the effect of Hispanic growth information for Black participants and Asian participants from the $t$-values of the Hispanic growth versus control information coefficients.

We conducted fixed effects meta-analyses (see Table 2) in which the mean effect sizes (i.e., mean correlations) were weighted by sample size (see Goh, Hall, & Rosenthal, 2016). We first calculated the overall effect size ($Mr$) of Hispanic growth information on non-Hispanic participants’ political ideology/policy positions across studies. A reliable effect, albeit relatively modest in magnitude, emerged, $Mr = 0.08$, $p < .001$, indicating that Hispanic population growth information leads other minority group members to express more conservative political attitudes and ideology.

We conducted a contrast analysis to test whether the results were driven by members of either of the most prevalent racial minority groups in our samples (Black = 1, Asian = −1, other non-Hispanic racial minority groups = 0). Regardless of whether fixed-effect, $Z_{\text{contrast}} = -0.83$, $p = .404$, or random-effect, $t(10) = -0.71, p = .497$, models are tested (two-tailed), results do not find evidence consistent with moderation by participant ethnicity. These results suggest that the observed effect of Hispanic population growth information on non-Hispanic racial minority group members’ political attitudes was not primarily driven by participants of any particular racial minority group.

**General Discussion**

Across four studies, making information about Hispanic population growth salient led non-Hispanic racial minority group members to identify as more conservative and express support for more conservative policy positions. This work is consistent with research examining how demographic changes influence Whites’ political ideology and behavior (e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2014a; Eno, 2016; Willer et al., 2016), but is the first to examine racial minority group members’ political reactions to the increasing racial diversity of the nation. Consistent with prior research, these results suggest that making salient the changing national racial demographics (in which Hispanic population growth plays a large part) may elicit more conservative ideology and attitudes among both members of the current majority group and members of minority groups not portrayed as driving the population changes.
Intriguingly, the present work revealed evidence of conservative shift among non-Hispanic racial minorities even when the changing racial demographics were described as creating a “majority–minority” nation, and thus, different racial minority groups were framed as a collective (as in Study 3a). This suggests that simply labeling the increased national diversity as an increase in “minority” representation may not be sufficient for racial minority groups to automatically perceive commonality with one another. In contrast, highlighting the potential for common experiences as a result of the increased diversity may elicit different, perhaps more coalitional, outcomes (see Cortland et al., in press; Craig & Richeson, 2012). Consistent with prior research, the present work underscores the importance of developing more comprehensive models of intergroup relations that explicitly consider relations among members of different minority groups (see Craig & Richeson, 2016; Richeson & Craig, 2011).

Implications and Future Directions

This research holds considerable practical significance, as it suggests that the very ways in which media outlets report on the impending U.S. racial demographic changes can lead racial minority group members who are not portrayed as driving the increased diversity to endorse political conservatism more strongly. The present studies examined non-Hispanic minority group members’ political reactions to Hispanic population growth, largely to reflect the media narrative regarding increasing national diversity (e.g., Roberts, 2008). Asian Americans, however, are also growing rapidly (Pew Research Center, 2014). The initial examination of how Asian population growth influences political ideology in Study 4 revealed ambiguous results. Consequently, it is vital for future research to examine how and why Asian American population growth may affect other ethnic groups’ political and social attitudes. Indeed, recent work suggests that different mechanisms may drive Whites’ reluctance to stay in a diversifying neighborhood, depending on which group is growing (Zou & Cheryan, 2017): While concerns about safety and property values drove Whites’ intentions to move in response to more Black neighbors, intentions to move due to more Asian neighbors were primarily driven by concerns about foreign cultural practices. Increasing Hispanic neighbors evoked both kinds of threat (Zou & Cheryan, 2017).

This accords with recent theorizing that perceived societal status and perceived cultural foreignness position groups in the U.S. racial hierarchy (Zou & Cheryan, 2017; see also Danbold & Huo, 2015). Consistent with the present research, concerns about cultural norms may be less impactful in shifting minorities’ political attitudes, compared with status-based concerns that may elicit competition. Generally, testing how growth in different populations is perceived by Whites and racial minority out-group members could illuminate which threats are elicited for which groups and, subsequently, the likely political and social outcomes.

Conclusions

The present research examined how racial minority group members’ political ideology and attitudes are influenced by information about Hispanic population growth. These results suggest that Hispanic population growth motivates conservatism among members of other racial minority groups, an effect that has been found previously among Whites (Craig & Richeson, 2014a). Taken together, this work suggests the racial demographic shift toward a “majority–minority” nation may motivate greater support for conservative ideology among a broad cross-section of the U.S. citizenry.

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Supplemental Material

The supplemental material is available in the online version of the article.

Notes

1. See supplemental materials for additional sample demographic information for all studies.
2. Participants who were not racial minority group members were filtered into another study immediately following the initial demographic questions.
3. See supplemental materials for analyses conducted without covariates.
4. Including the participants who failed the attention checks does not influence the results.
5. A random-effects test revealed consistent results, $Mr = 0.11, t(15) = 5.61, p < .001$, two-tailed.
6. Contrast analyses comparing Black vs. other non-Hispanic groups or Asian versus other non-Hispanic groups reveal similar null results ($ps > .349$).

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